University of Allamah Tabatabaei , arvinmoradi72@gmail.com
Abstract: (1060 Views)
This paper investigates the theory of Reism through the perspectives of Brentano and Kotarbiński, examining its contribution to clarifying philosophical concepts and resolving linguistic ambiguities. Reism, by denying the existence of abstract entities and emphasizing concrete objects, seeks to separate genuine philosophical issues from pseudo-problems that arise due to imprecise language. Brentano’s approach, centered on his theory of intentionality, asserts that every mental act is directed toward a concrete object. He argued that dismissing abstract constructs—such as universals, properties, and relations—can streamline language and logic, thereby alleviating philosophical skepticism and confusion. Extending this line of thought, Kotarbiński further developed Reism by proposing that all philosophical concepts be reduced solely to concrete objects. He argued that language should function as a precise instrument, stripped of abstract elements like qualities, relations, and states of affairs, to ensure clarity in philosophical discourse. Employing Lesniewski’s logical system, he shows how Reism addresses significant challenges in analytic philosophy, including issues related to non-existent proper names and difficulties inherent in Frege’s theory of meaning. Although critics note that rejecting abstract entities may limit its applicability in domains such as mathematics and set theory, the theory’s emphasis on simplicity and linguistic clarity continues to offer valuable insights into both linguistic and metaphysical studies.
Type of Study:
Original Article |
Subject:
Philosophy
References
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