Volume 1, Issue 2 (Autumn and Winter 2020)
پژوهش های مابعدالطبیعی 2020, 1(2): 109-134 |
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Ahmadi F, Falahi asl H, Asgari M. A Critique of Schopenhover's View on Authority. پژوهش های مابعدالطبیعی 2020; 1 (2) :109-134
URL: http://mi.khu.ac.ir/article-1-75-en.html
URL: http://mi.khu.ac.ir/article-1-75-en.html
Lorestan University
Abstract: (1284 Views)
Schopenhauer believes In his metaphsics that everything in the world as determined by the will,under the principle of sufficient reason and the time and the place, and necessarily become objective. Naturally, the human will as the moral foundation should follow the principle of sufficient reason and objectivity will necessarily, In this case, the fundamental moral Schopenhauer is excluded because the ethics need to freedom and stay out of the realm of the principle of sufficient reason. He goes to side separation nomen and phenomen that resolve this obstacle with establish term Liberum arbitrium indiffentiae and attribute liberty to nomen; while human will as the base of morality located in realm phenomen and under the principle of sufficient reason and the time and the place. Therefore followes of necessity and is not free. Other subject is that Schopenhauer believes that human will is freedom capacity being and substance not capacity act; while liberum arbitrium prove in morality realm through freedom in acts. Therefore Schopenhauer problem doesn't solve with mere accept freedom capacity being and substance.
Keywords: Schopenhauer, Morality, Will, Principle of sufficient reason, Liberum arbitrium, Necessity
Type of Study: Original Article |
Subject:
Philosophy
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