Showing 7 results for Will
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Kharazmi University Rasoul Rasoulipour, Graduate Student in Philosophy Arya Younesi,
Volume 1, Issue 1 (5-2014)
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the relation between Will and Knowledge especially the effect of the will on knowledge in its Western philosophical tradition. A short record of the issue from the ancient to the present time is offered and William James, a twentieth century American philosopher, is introduced as the criterion in this field. Therefore, the history of the issue is divided to three periods: “Before James”, “James”, and “After James”. The role of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer are narrated as two key philosophers in the first period and it is explained why they are not widely welcomed in this regard in the world of philosophy. Later, we examine the general lines of James’ theory especially his “The Will to Believe”. In this part, we show that some of James assumptions are not acceptable, although, his theory in general is defendable. Finally, we look at Quine’s thought as the philosopher who spread James’ teachings recently among the philosophers. We show that Quine’s naturalism, universalism, and even his naturalized epistemology have been influenced by James. At the end of this paper, the influential contemporary philosophers in this field are introduced.
Fatemeh Ahmadi, Hossein Fallahi Asl, Masoud Asgari,
Volume 1, Issue 1 (7-2020)
Abstract
Schopenhauer emphasizes on concepts as will entity, teleology, eroticism, pleasure, invisible will and beings languish in his metaphysics; while it is contradiction making clear all this of direction him. Say when discussion is over invisible will nature, Schopenhauer insist to indirection that, while in ealse realms he attribute an unconscious purposeful to that. This is evident example of that: " yearling bird doesn't have any imaginary of eggs that build nest for them; young spider doesn't have any imaginary of hunting that weave gossamer for that; eater doesn't have any imaginary of ant to dig cavity after that first time, and … will is ongoing in action of this fauna clearly". Schopenhauer doesn't front to this question that how is possible an unconscious driftage identicalness itself in a world pregnant purposeful action. And of course in world that any little bit and any movement of that following from newton physic rules.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Kharazmi University Mohhamad Javad Rezaeirah, Graduated in Philosophy, Kharazmi University Leila Nosrati,
Volume 1, Issue 2 (12-2014)
Abstract
Some orientalists imput Mu'tazila’s doctrine to the foreign sources and say: Mu'tazila’s teachings, such as free will, come from other traditions. They claim that Islam is the religion of the fate and destiny, and the Will of God is extended to every being in the universe, so Islam is a determinist religion and Mu'tazila’s defence of the free will cannot genuinely be raised from their teachings.
This Paper is to show that the doctrine of free will is a genuine idea of Mu'tazila and different approaches among Muslim thinkers towards the verses of the Quran, the Prophet’s narratives and the other internal factors formed the doctrines of determinism (compulsion), absolute free will (submission) and neither/nor (al-amr al- bain al-amrain). According to this research, the ideas of determinism and submission cannot be very much harmonized with the Islamic principles. The doctrine of “al-amr-al- bain al-amrain” is more justified by the Quranic verses and Islamic narratives.
Fatemeh Ahmadi, Hossein Falahi Asl, Masud Asgari,
Volume 1, Issue 2 (12-2020)
Abstract
Schopenhauer believes In his metaphsics that everything in the world as determined by the will,under the principle of sufficient reason and the time and the place, and necessarily become objective. Naturally, the human will as the moral foundation should follow the principle of sufficient reason and objectivity will necessarily, In this case, the fundamental moral Schopenhauer is excluded because the ethics need to freedom and stay out of the realm of the principle of sufficient reason. He goes to side separation nomen and phenomen that resolve this obstacle with establish term Liberum arbitrium indiffentiae and attribute liberty to nomen; while human will as the base of morality located in realm phenomen and under the principle of sufficient reason and the time and the place. Therefore followes of necessity and is not free. Other subject is that Schopenhauer believes that human will is freedom capacity being and substance not capacity act; while liberum arbitrium prove in morality realm through freedom in acts. Therefore Schopenhauer problem doesn't solve with mere accept freedom capacity being and substance.
Mohamad Jafar Jamebozorgi, Maryam Jamebozorgi,
Volume 3, Issue 1 (4-2022)
Abstract
In philosophies of education based on religious knowledge, the two basic concepts of God and sin as two motivating and deterrent elements have the highest educational function in these systems. Although, according to Nietzsche, God and every other concept related to him is the product of the pathological thoughts of humble human beings and for the purpose of intoxicating and fooling mankind, he rejected the values before him and established the values on the basis of which The will to power is its stronghold. Nietzsche's superhuman is not as a product but as a culture, the head and stem of education, nor is it based on taming but on principles such as self-sacrifice, discipline and command.In Nietzsche's proposed culture, God is the source of power and abundance, and closeness to him is my weak negation and finding myself in the superior semen. In the leading research, first by conceptual analysis, the meaning of sin and God has been studied first in Christian thought and then in Nietzsche's intellectual system.The ultimate goal of creating new values, the principle of transforming the survival-oriented will into the power-oriented will, as well as the practical recommendations of internal command and attention to all aspects of life, were extracted.
Aliasghar Ahmadi, Bahram Alizadeh,
Volume 4, Issue 1 (5-2023)
Abstract
Mystical theories such as the unity of existence and annihilation seem to conflict with the issue of free will. The main aspect of the conflict is that it is thought that there is no trace of humans left in the mystical stages and positions so that free will can be proved for him. When the human is not present as the doer of the optional activities in the mystical stages, it is natural that choosing and selecting humans in these positions will not be meaningful. This study indicates that there is no conflict and confrontation with human selection in these theories. To prove this claim, firstly, the principle of conflicting theories along with the direction of conflict of each one is mentioned, and then a comprehensive philosophical redefinition of free will is presented by using the two elements of dignity and human nature to be under a coherent and integrated system and to have the power to support this superior human characteristic in all dimensions and levels. Philosophical semantics of free will be threatened by some rules when they are answered to fully support the redefinition and to resolve some mystical ambiguities in this direction, two key principles and rules " Subordination of knowledge from the known" and "Sir al-Qadr" are used. According to these two principles, no will create an obstacle to the freedom of human action and humans are responsible for their free choices at every stage.
Fatemeh Bagheri Monfared, Bahram Alizade,
Volume 5, Issue 1 (8-2024)
Abstract
Paul Helm believes that there are good reasons that divine omniscience - which includes the future - with human freedom understood in an incompatibilist sense is logically inconsistent. But this tension should not lead us to a reduced theory of divine foreknowledge, just as it should not negate human freedom and responsibility. Helm has argued that a Christian theist may accept a compatibilist sense of human freedom; first, the Christian doctrine of "God's grace" is compatible only with the compatibilist version of human freedom. Second because God is omniscient, it must be omniscient in a strong sense, and this is the case only if compatibilism is true. We will say that Helm's first argument will lead to the denial of some other accepted doctrines of religions, including Christianity, and his second argument falls into affirming the consequences. But Helm's third reason is that necessarily, if God knows x in advance (which He does), then x will necessarily occur. To avoid problems, he emphasizes that what he means by "necessity" is a historical and not logical necessity. But this argument only works when we accept that God is in time. Therefore, those who consider divine knowledge timeless can claim that all events exist in the divine mind in a necessary way and His knowledge is not necessary because it is in the past. It seems that Helm himself also accepts this problem.