Metaphysical Investigations

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In the division of theories of the philosophy of mind, all kinds of physicalists, whether reductionist or non-reductionist, are considered Monist; Because they believe in the physicality of everything. Reductionist physicists, on the other hand, believe that in addition to knowing everything as physical, everything can be reduced to lower levels of physics; But non-reductionists in physicalism, although they consider everything to be physical, believe that in the field of physics we are confronted with "emergent" things that cannot be reduced to the fundamental particles of physics and given a microphysical explanation of Have them; Because we are basically dealing with something new; But "property dualism", by acknowledging the non-physical nature of mental features, believes in two kinds of things in the universe and, as a result, has fundamentally rejected both Monist physicalist theories. Moreover, although in feature dualism, as in non-reductionist physicalism, we encounter a genus of non-reductionism and novelty, non-reductionism and novelty in property dualism are "species" and "species," respectively. Is "fundamental", not "typical" and "superficial". The present article prevents further sputum by clarifying the exact boundaries of the dualistic nature of property with physicalism, especially its non-reductionist type.

Keywords: Reductive Physicalism, Non-Reductive Physicalism, Property Dualism, Emergent, Supervenience

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