The Human Search for the Value of Life: From Aristotle’s Good Life to Susan Wolf’s Meaningful Life

The question of what makes a human life valuable was formulated in ancient philosophy primarily in terms of the good life and happiness, whereas in contemporary philosophy, the concept of “meaning in life” has become one of the significant formulations of this question. In her theory of a meaningful life, Susan Wolf rejects, on the one hand, the reduction of meaning in life to subjective satisfaction and pleasure and, on the other, the view that the mere existence of objectively valuable activities is sufficient for a meaningful life. Instead, she emphasizes the necessity of a connection between an individual’s active engagement with activities and projects and their objective value. By contrast, Aristotle conceives of the good life in terms of eudaimonia, understood as activity of the soul in accordance with virtue over a complete life.



The central question of this article is to what extent Wolf’s theory of a meaningful life overlaps with the normative structure of Aristotle’s account of the good life and eudaimonia, and in which components this overlap becomes evident. Using an analytical-comparative method, this study argues that, despite fundamental differences between the two theories in their metaphysical and teleological foundations, there is considerable overlap between them in their emphasis on human activity, value beyond personal preference, the individual’s active engagement, and the practical realization of a valuable life. Nevertheless, unlike Aristotle, Wolf does not situate these elements within a teleological account of human nature and a conception of a final good. Therefore, Wolf’s theory cannot be identified with Aristotle’s theory of eudaimonia or regarded as its direct historical continuation. Rather, some of the normative components of the Aristotelian conception of the good life can be understood as having been reformulated in Wolf’s contemporary theory within a secular and substantially different framework. The article concludes that the distinction between “eudaimonia” and “meaning in life” does not imply a complete discontinuity between the two questions; rather, they exhibit a significant connection and overlap at the level of normative structure.