A Critical Examination of Philosophical Pessimism and the Problem of Suffering in Schopenhauer’s Thought Based on the Foundations of Transcendent Philosophy

The problem of suffering and the pessimistic interpretation of life are central themes in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer and play a fundamental role in his understanding of being, the human condition, and the possibility of meaning in life. This study asks whether Schopenhauer’s philosophical pessimism—grounded in his theory of the world as will and representation—can adequately explain human suffering and its relation to meaning and happiness, and how this view may be critically assessed from the perspective of Mullā á¹¢adrā’s Transcendent Philosophy (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyya). Using an analytical–critical method, the article examines key concepts such as will, suffering, meaning, and teleology in both philosophical systems. The findings show that, in Schopenhauer’s thought, due to an will-centered and non-teleological conception of reality, suffering is regarded as intrinsic and unavoidable, and the possibility of positive meaning and lasting happiness is denied. In contrast, Mullā á¹¢adrā conceives existence as original, gradational, and intrinsically good, and interprets suffering as a relative and privative phenomenon situated within the framework of the best possible order (niẓām al-aḥsan), substantial motion, and cosmic teleology, allowing suffering to contribute to human existential perfection and the deepening of meaning in life.