نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
The argument from frustration of purpose is a major rational proof used by Imāmī theologians to establish the absolute infallibility of prophets. Grounded in divine wisdom and the purposiveness of God’s acts, it maintains that the aim of Prophethood, comprehensive human guidance and true felicity, cannot be fully realized unless the prophet is protected from error, forgetfulness, and sin. Any possibility of such defects would weaken communal trust and render prophetic guidance uncertain. Imāmī thinkers explain this protection as extrinsic impossibility: the prophet retains free will and power, yet lacks any effective motive for sin because of immediate knowledge, profound love of God, and a firmly rooted moral disposition. Using an analytical-critical method and relying on classical Imāmī sources and contemporary discussions, this study examines objections to the argument, including the sufficiency of relative infallibility, the principle of greater good and lesser evil, analogies with religious authorities, and the Humean is–ought objection. It argues that these critiques confuse partial with complete realization of divine purpose, overlook the unique status of Prophethood, and misunderstand divine knowledge, will, and power. Consequently, divine wisdom requires comprehensive prophetic infallibility throughout life and in all domains of religious guidance and practice.
کلیدواژهها English
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