year 3, Issue 6 (1-2023)
پژوهش های مابعدالطبیعی 2023, 3(6): 249-274 |
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Kharazmi university
Abstract: (391 Views)
Gilbert Ryle, in his book, The Concept of Mind (1949) discussed about denial of mind, identity of mind and mental states, through his physicalism and reductionism approaches. On a basis of Descartes’ dualism, he argued that believing in the existence of mind alongside mental states, is a category mistake that has baffled philosophers. He believed we should not relate mental states to a substance called mind, as we relate physical states to the body; Mind is but a name for a series of applied mental states and has no existence beyond words.
Ryle’s main issue is his inaccurate understanding of mind’s inception and its connection to the body. It would appear that we can present a different explanation of substantiality of mind and its contrast with mental states by referring to Sadra’s viewpoint of mind’s inception and its connection to the body, which Ryle's problems are not directed towards. According to this information, a substance named mind exists which mental states are based upon.
Ryle’s main issue is his inaccurate understanding of mind’s inception and its connection to the body. It would appear that we can present a different explanation of substantiality of mind and its contrast with mental states by referring to Sadra’s viewpoint of mind’s inception and its connection to the body, which Ryle's problems are not directed towards. According to this information, a substance named mind exists which mental states are based upon.
Article number: 10
Type of Study: Original Article |
Subject:
Philosophy
Received: 2022/08/26 | Accepted: 2022/10/21 | Published: 2023/01/30
Received: 2022/08/26 | Accepted: 2022/10/21 | Published: 2023/01/30
References
1. Copleston,F.(1997) A history of philosophy, Vol.6, search press, London
2. Foster, J. (2018). A brief defense of the Cartesian view. In Soul, Body, and Survival (pp. 15-29). Cornell University Press
3. Hume, D.; A Treatise of Human Nature; Clarendon Press, 2007
4. Ryle, G. (2009). The concept of mind. Routledge.
5. Swinburne, Richard (1986). The Evolution of the Soul, Oxford: Clarendon.
6. Tanney, J. (2009). Rethinking Ryle: a critical discussion of The Concept of Mind.
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