What is the role of truth in the nature of belief? In a common article, Nishi Shah and David Vellman present an explanation for belief in which the role of truth is based on a normative standard. In doing this, they exploit a relationship which they call transparency. The outcome of their explanation, to believe some proposition, after a quasi-ethical judgment, can be the subject of rightness or wrongness. The purpose of this article is to show that the need on the base of which they require to include a normative aspect in the nature of belief has no base, and it is possible to present a perfectly descriptive and aim-oriented approach which explains the responsibility about truth at the same time. In order to do this, based on library research method, we first will try to provide a panorama of each of two approaches, aim-oriented and normative, so then can compare the strengths and weaknesses. In the end, with some criticism regarding the normative point of view, we show that the aim-oriented approach has more consistency with our common sense from belief instances, and can be explained in a way that avoids the problem which Shah and Velman insist on.

Keywords: “truth”, “aim of belief”, “transparency”, “normative standard”

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