عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
The question of how knowledge is discovered remains one of the central yet relatively underexplored issues in epistemology. While philosophers have often devoted far greater attention to ontological problems, Allāmah Tabātabāī offers an important and original contribution to this topic. In addition to writing a dedicated essay on the subject, “The Value of the Known” in Usul-i Falsafeh va Ravesh-e Realism, he also addresses it in various parts of his broader works.
Tabātabāī develops two distinct approaches. In his philosophical approach, grounded in the principle of essential objectivity, he maintains that certain acquired knowledge discovers the known by accident. In contrast, in his fundamental approach, he denies the possibility of genuine discovery altogether, aiming to pave the way for a more authentic understanding of knowledge. Essential objectivity, however, cannot be regarded as a sufficient criterion for discovery, both because it excludes philosophical and logical secondary intelligibles and because it conflicts with the doctrine of the primacy of existence.
This paper argues, through a logical analysis of concepts, that Tabātabāī’s two main arguments for rejecting true discovery are incomplete and therefore unjustified. First, something can be relational and, at the same time, represent something beyond itself. Second, something can represent another reality without being “annihilated” within it.
کلیدواژهها English
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