حقیقت به‌منزلۀ جوهر و سوژه: تأملی بر دریافت هگل از مسئلۀ کانتیِ وحدت شیء

Kant conceives the unity of an object as the result of the synthetic activity of the understanding and as grounded in the transcendental unity of apperception. Hegel regards this account as incomplete and, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, argues that genuine unity arises through the process of the realization of the Concept and the dialectical unity of subject and object. Two contrasting interpretations have emerged in reading Hegel’s approach in the Phenomenology: the non‑metaphysical reading and the metaphysical reading. The former understands the realization of the Concept as an extension and radicalization of the logic of self‑consciousness, whereas the latter interprets the work as a metaphysical redefinition of rationality as the intrinsic structure of reality itself. This paper compares these alternative interpretations of Hegel’s response to the Kantian problem of the unity of objects. By focusing on the text of the Phenomenology of Spirit and analyzing its dialectical progression, it argues that the metaphysical interpretation aligns more coherently with both the structure of the work and the development of Hegel’s argument. An examination of the movement from Consciousness and Self-Consciousness to Reason shows that overcoming the impasse of skepticism requires maintaining the objectivity and externality of substance. According to the slogan that “substance is subject,” the categorial structure is not merely subjective but expresses the rational structure of reality itself. Thus, the metaphysical reading offers a more adequate account of Hegel’s solution to the problem of the unity of objects.