Metaphysical Investigations

fa On the Knowability Asymmetry of Theism On the Knowability Asymmetry of Theism فلسفی Philosophy مقاله پژوهشی Original Article <div style="direction: ltr; text-align: justify;">The knowability asymmetry of theism (KAT) is based on a revived version of Pascal's wager inspired by pragmatic encroachment (a recent thesis on the stand of pragmatic considerations in epistemology). According to KAT, as the practical costs of being wrong in believing in God far outweigh the (infinite) costs of believing in atheism if false (due to being deprived of the infinite gains of eternal life), arguably theistic knowledge is far easier to come by than its atheistic counterpart since it requires weaker justificatory support than atheism. In this paper we seek to criticize KAT arguing that it unjustifiably favors theism and oversimplifies the nature of stakes. Drawing from the debates on the axiology of theism and its implications about the axiological dimensions of stakes, we contend that the practical significance of being wrong about theism is not necessarily overriding to atheism. Finally we suggest that instead of laying the emphasis on pragmatic encroachment which is based on mere personal practical preferences, what seems better to be prioritized is moral encroachment. In conclusion we make an effort to rehabilitate KAT on the basis of moral rather than personal practical advantages/disadvantages of theism. </div> <div style="direction: ltr;">  </div> : The knowability asymmetry of theism (KAT) is based on a revived version of Pascal's wager inspired by pragmatic encroachment (a recent thesis on the stand of pragmatic considerations in epistemology). According to KAT, as the practical costs of being wrong in believing in God far outweigh the (infinite) costs of believing in atheism if false (due to being deprived of the infinite gains of eternal life), arguably theistic knowledge is far easier to come by than its atheistic counterpart since it requires weaker justificatory support than atheism. In this paper we seek to criticize KAT arguing that it unjustifiably favors theism and oversimplifies the nature of stakes. Drawing from the debates on the axiology of theism and its implications about the axiological dimensions of stakes, we contend that the practical significance of being wrong about theism is not necessarily overriding to atheism. Finally we suggest that instead of laying the emphasis on pragmatic encroachment which is based on mere personal practical preferences, what seems better to be prioritized is moral encroachment. In conclusion we make an effort to rehabilitate KAT on the basis of moral rather than personal practical advantages/disadvantages of theism. Pragmatic encroachment, Pascal’s wager, the knowability asymmetry of theism, axiology of theism, moral encroachment. Pragmatic encroachment, Pascal’s wager, the knowability asymmetry of theism, axiology of theism, moral encroachment 0 0 http://mi.khu.ac.ir/browse.php?a_code=A-10-386-1&slc_lang=fa&sid=1 Ebrahim Azadegan ابراهیم آزادگان azadegan@sharif.ir 10031947532846002656 10031947532846002656 Yes Sharif university of technology دانشگاه صنعتی شریف Zeinab Salari زینب سالاری salarizeinab@yahoo.com 10031947532846002657 10031947532846002657 No Sharif university of technology دانشگاه صنعتی شریف